What
It Is And Why It Doesn't Work
"The
complexity of the problem must not be underestimated. Electronic
surveillance can be a useful tool for the Government’s gathering of
certain kinds of information; yet, if
abused, it can also constitute a particularly indiscriminate and
penetrating invasion of the privacy of our citizens.
My objective over the past six years has been to reach some kind of
fair balance that will protect
the security of the United States without infringing on our citizens’
human liberties and rights."
– Chief Bill Sponsor, Senator Edward Kennedy (emphasis added)
It
All Started in the Seventies. In
the early 1970s, under Presidents Nixon and Ford, massive abuses of
surveillance by the FBI, the CIA, the U.S. Military, and the White
House were exposed. In response to these abuses, Congress passed the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which, in turn,
established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC or FISA
Court). Congress set up this Court to provide a system of judicial
review and approval (or denial) of the government's proposed
surveillance actions, along with necessary safeguards against abuse
whenever the surveillance might involve an American citizen. Because
foreign intelligence surveillance requires certain measures of
secrecy, the details of surveillance requests and the FISA Court's
actions are classified.
Why
We Need Control Over Government Surveillance.
Working behind
closed doors, the FISA Court has the authority to approve or deny
government requests for accessing and searching business or personal
information – and not just telephone metadata.
They can also gather
specific information from e-mails chat sessions, and text messages, and any
attachments. These items can include privileged attorney-client
communication, sensitive communication between you and your doctor,
and even communication between you and your accountant, tax preparer,
financial adviser, etc.
They can also collect information
from sites visited, uploads and downloads made, on-line shopping and
purchases – you name it: if it is digital they can access it. That
includes user IDs and passwords for protected sites you visit, including your credit card and bank accounts.
They can get such a broad array of information that they can get to
know you and your pattern of living better than your closest friends.
Anything a hacker can do, they can do, too -- only better. And they are able to do all this behind a shroud of secrecy, without
your even suspecting that they are doing it to you. That is why we
need control over such surveillance. It is too dangerous otherwise.
The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). This
law was enacted in response to allegations
of abuse by the federal government in conducting electronic
surveillance. It was recognized that some kind of judicial warrant
should be required for such surveillance to protect citizens' rights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. This law
required the government to obtain a judicial warrant authorizing the
surveillance.
The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC or FISA Court)
This court was authorized by FISA to
review and approve or deny surveillance requests. It consists of a
pool of eleven judges, all of whom are appointed by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Submission
of Surveillance Requests. These are
usually originated by one of our security agencies, such as the CIA
or FBI who sends them to the NSA where warrant applications are
prepared and forwarded to the Office of the Attorney General, where
they are certified that the proposed surveillance targets are either
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. (“Agent of a
foreign power" is defined as meaning any person, other than a
United States person, who acts in the United States as an officer or
an employee of a foreign government or any component thereof, whether
or not recognized by the United States.) If the target is a U.S.
Citizen or a resident alien, he or she must reasonably be believed to
be involved in the planning or commission of a crime that poses a
threat to our national security.
Secret
Hearings with Secret Decisions.
Warrant applications are then assigned on
a rotating basis to one of the FISA Court judges, who evaluates the
requests and either approves or rejects them, based entirely on the
statements of government officials. There is nobody to represent the
other side of the issue or to protect the people from potentially
overreaching requests or decisions. Because of the sensitive nature
of this surveillance, the Court's work is performed in secret, so we
never know what specific decisions are made and why, or what impact
they may have on our Constitutional rights.
Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).
FISA also established this court to serve
somewhat like an appellate court for decisions made the the FISA
Court. This body consists of three judges, also appointed by the
Chief Justice, to review, upon request, decisions made by the FISA
Court. Because no no opposing counsel is allowed in the FISA Court
cases, the only appeals that are normally allowed are those from the
government. From 1978 to 2002, no cases were brought to this Court,
and only two are known to have been brought before it since then.
FISCR
Rules. The first
FISA Court of Review ruling came in 2002. The FISA Court had granted
a warrant to the FBI, but made it subject to certain restrictions,
most notably of which was that the FBI was not to use evidence
gathered under the warrant to prosecute criminal cases. The Court of
Review ruled that there was no constitutional basis for the
restrictions.
FISCR
Rules Again. Six
years later, the Court of Review delved into another questionable
area when it ruled on and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Protect America Act of 2007.
A
Second (But Secret) Supreme Court? In
ruling on these two issues, the FISA Court of Review made rulings
based upon its interpretations of the Constitution, which, at the
national level, is the normally considered to be the realm of the
Supreme Court. In so doing, the Court of Review may have muddied
the line between the role of the two courts and lent credence to the
notion that the FISA Court of Review is becoming a second (but
secret) Supreme Court.
Disorder
in the Court.
In
2002, the Justice Department asked the FISA Court to grant them broad
new powers, but the Court refused, saying that the
government had misused the law and misled the court dozens of times.
The court released an
opinion alleging
that FBI and Justice Department officials had supplied erroneous
information to the court in more than 75 applications for search
warrants and wiretaps, including one that had been signed by the
Director of the FBI at the time.
Bush
Administration Ignored Court.
Apparently, the Bush administration decided to ignore the FISA Court
and the procedures for obtaining approval for surveillance. Three
years later, The
New York Times
reported that the Bush administration had been conducting illegal
surveillance of U.S. citizens without the knowledge or approval of
the FISA Court since 2002. Four days later, Judge James Robertson
abruptly resigned his position as a member of the FISA Court. Congress later passed legislation making Bush's actions legal and made the law retroactive, to prevent prosecution for illegal search, and to grant immunity to the companies who provided the information to the administration.
Need for Advocate Counsel in the FISA Court. Former FISA Court Judge Robertson
has been quoted as saying, "Anyone who has been a judge will tell you that a judge needs to hear both sides
of a case." He
went on to say that, since the government presents instances where it
wants to use its powers under FISA to go to the FISA Court without an
advocate for the other side, the Court is not well placed to act in an unbiased manner
and judge the merits of the case, because the Court hears only one side of the case. He said that the system is flawed
because of its failure to allow adversarial counsel to question the
government's actions. Robertson said the system needed the presence
of a legal adversary to act as a check on the government's programs.
Another former judge who served on the FISA Court, James Carr, has
proposed that the judges themselves could appoint independent lawyers as
special counsels on a case-by-case basis. He suggests the advocate
should also have the power to appeal FISA decisions to higher courts;
something only the government can do at this time.
Without an opposing counsel, Robertson says that when the government presents its case to the FISC without adversarial counsel, the process becomes more like administrative approval process than
a court hearing with true judgment on the merits of the case.
Some
Food for Thought. How would you feel if eleven people,
without any meaningful oversight by, or responsibility to, a higher
authority, rotated decision-making among the individual members, one
at a time, and ruled secretly on matters that could adversely affect
your everyday life, eat away at your democracy, and destroy
Constitutional rights that deal with privacy, unreasonable search and
seizure, due process, and self-incrimination? Yet, that is exactly
we have under FISA.
And
Even Worse . . . Those eleven judges on the FISA Court
were all appointed by one person (a political partisan who espouses a
particular ideology), who is also without any meaningful oversight
by, or responsibility to, a higher authority, and without any
confirmation hearings, any examination of nominees' philosophies and
prior rulings on matters likely to come before the Court, without any
public input, and without confirmation or rejection of the nominees
by a government body that is elected to represent the welfare and
defend the rights of the American people?
But, Worst of All …
All of the judges who have ever served on the FISA
Court and the FISA Court of Review since it was established in 1978
have been appointed solely by conservative Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court, and the present one could continue to do so for a
combined total of 25 to 30 years. The sad part is that of all these
things are true. Through 2012, FISA Courts have approved 99.97% of
the 33,949 requests submitted to them. Does this sound like a good
system of checks and balances that should continue indefinitely?
Heading
Away from Diversity – and Away from Democracy.
If a country allowed all appointments to such powerful positions to
be made by one person who is an established partisan politician (and
who is accountable to no one), and if these Court appointees operate
in secrecy, allowing only one side to present its case with no
advocates for the other side, could you honestly view this process as
being democratic? Overtly, we claim we live in a democracy, but
covertly we we give many indications of creeping more and more toward
a totalitarian form of government. And FISA is a major example of
this.
Opinions
from Law Professionals.
Stephen Vladeck, Law Professor at American University's Washington
College of Law says:
"Since
FISA was enacted in 1978, we've had three chief justices, and they
have all been conservative Republicans, so I
think one can worry that there is insufficient diversity,"
Penn Law Professor, Theodore Ruger
says,
“The
judges are hand-picked by someone” (presently Chief Justice
Roberts), “who, through his votes on the Supreme Court, has
demonstrated his particular view on civil liberties and law
enforcement,. The way FISA is set up, it gives him unchecked
authority to put judges on the court who feel the same way he does."
Wouldn't
our country would be better served if these judges
represented a broader spectrum of political views?
Which Party Is Most Likely to Support Civil Liberties?
In the last 30 years, Supreme Court justices appointed by Democratic
presidents support civil liberties claims approximately 74 percent of
the time, while those appointed by Republican presidents support
civil liberty claims only about 38 percent of the time. This is just
one example of how the justices appear to arrive at their legal
opinions -- largely along party lines. I am sure that our founding
fathers would be very disappointed if they knew that any appearance
of unbiased and nonpolitical findings and rulings seems to have all
but vanished from the Supreme Court.
How
does that Apply to the FISA Courts?
Over their 35-year history, we find that 91% of the judges for these
courts were appointed by Republicans and only 9% were appointed by
Democrats. Out of 13 currently-filled positions, only one is
occupied by a Democrat. (One position on the three-person FISA Court
of Review has been vacant for more than a year.) Because the FISA
Court deals largely with issues involving civil liberties, and
because 10 of its 11 members are Republicans, that might explain why
the FISA Court seems to be more receptive to issuing warrants that
might impact civil liberties.
A
Little Help from Your Friends.
Because of an extremely high rate of approval, the FISA Court has
been perceived as being a rubber stamp for the government's
surveillance requests. Apparently, there have been more than 500
requests that were not acceptable as submitted, so the FISA Court
rulings essentially told the submitters what they needed to change to
get those requests accepted. Apparently, that helped the government
get its approval rate at 99.97%
FISA
Secrecy Attacked.
A 2003 Senate
Judiciary Committee
Interim Report on FBI Oversight in
the 107th Congress by the Senate Judiciary Committee: FISA
Implementation Failures, cited the
"unnecessary secrecy" of the court among its "most
important conclusions":
"The
secrecy of individual FISA cases is certainly necessary, but this
secrecy has been extended to the most basic legal and procedural
aspects of the FISA, which should not be secret. This unnecessary
secrecy contributed to the deficiencies that have hamstrung the
implementation of the FISA. Much more information, including all
unclassified opinions and operating rules of the FISA Court and Court
of Review, should be made public and/or provided to the Congress."
Allegations
of Bias. Elizabeth Gotein, a
co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program of the
Brennan Center for Justice at the New
York University School of Law,
has criticized the court as being too compromised to be an impartial
tribunal that oversees the work of the NSA and other U.S.
intelligence activities. She says:
"Like
any other group that meets in secret behind closed doors with only
one constituency appearing before them, they're subject to capture
and bias."
Julian
Sanchez,
a scholar at the Cato
Institute,
has described the near certainty of the polarization or group think
of the judges of the court. Because all of the judges are appointed
by the same person (the Chief
Justice of the United States)
and, because nearly all the judges are of the same political party
(the Republican
Party),
and because these judges hear no opposing testimony and feel no
pressure from colleagues or the public to moderate their rulings,
group polarization is almost a certainty. He says:
"There's
the real possibility that these judges become more extreme over time,
even when they had only a mild bias to begin with."
Court
Approves Requests, but Not Surveillance Programs.
Stephen Vladeck has argued that the FISA Court reviews requests
merely to ensure that they comply with various statutory
requirements, including court-approved policies allow the NSA to:
keep data
that could potentially contain details of U.S. persons for up to
five years, and
retain and
make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic
communications if they contain usable intelligence, information on
criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are
encrypted, or are believed to contain any information relevant to
cybersecurity.
However, the
Court does not approve the specific surveillance plan. Without
having to seek Court approval of the specifics of their plan, the
U.S. Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence can
apparently engage in sweeping programmatic surveillance at their
discretion.
According
to The Guardian:
"The
broad scope of the court orders, and the nature of the procedures set
out in the documents, appear to clash with assurances from President
Obama and senior intelligence officials that the NSA could not access
Americans' calls or email information without warrants."
The
Most Revealing and Damaging Insight.
Glenn Greenwald,
who published details of the PRISM surveillance program
in The
Guardian
,
explained:
“…
(T)his entire process is a
fig leaf, "oversight" in name only. It offers no real
safeguards. That's because no court monitors what the NSA is actually
doing when it claims to comply with the court-approved procedures.
Once the FISA Court puts its approval stamp on the NSA's procedures,
there is no external judicial check on which targets end up being
selected by the NSA analysts for eavesdropping. The only time
individualized warrants are required is when the NSA is specifically
targeting a US citizen or the communications are purely domestic.”
“When
it is time for the NSA to obtain FISA Court approval, the agency does
not tell the court whose calls and emails it intends to intercept. It
instead merely provides the general guidelines which it claims are
used by its analysts to determine which individuals they can target,
and the FISA Court judge then issues a simple order approving those
guidelines. “
“The
court endorses a one-paragraph form order stating that the NSA's
process 'contains all the required elements' and that the revised
NSA, FBI and CIA minimization procedures submitted with the amendment
'are consistent with the requirements of [50 U.S.C. §1881a(e)] and
with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
“As
but one typical example, The Guardian has obtained an August 19,
2010, FISA Court approval from Judge John Bates which does nothing
more than recite the statutory language in approving the NSA's
guidelines. Once the NSA has this court approval, it can then target
anyone chosen by their analysts, and can even order telecoms and
internet companies to turn over to them the emails, chats and calls
of those they target.”
The
FISA Court plays no role whatsoever in reviewing whether the
procedures it approved are actually complied with when the NSA starts
eavesdropping on calls and reading people's emails. The guidelines
submitted by the NSA to the Fisa court demonstrate how much
discretion the agency has in choosing who will be targeted.
The
only oversight for monitoring whether there is abuse comes from the
executive branch itself: from the DOJ and Director of National
Intelligence, which conduct "periodic reviews … to evaluate
the implementation of the procedure."
“At
a hearing before the House Intelligence Committee , deputy attorney
general James Cole testified that every 30 days, the FISA Court is
merely given an "aggregate number" of database searches on
US domestic phone records. The decisions about who has their emails
and telephone calls intercepted by the NSA is made by the NSA itself,
not by the FISA Court, except where the NSA itself concludes the
person is a US citizen and/or the communication is exclusively
domestic. But even in such cases, the NSA often ends up intercepting
those communications of Americans without individualized warrants,
and all of this is left to the discretion of the NSA analysts with no
real judicial oversight.”
Summary.
What's
Wrong with FISA?
It's
poorly worded, with terms that are either ambiguous or too broad to
be meaningful.
The
Court sometimes issues warrants or subpoenas without valid cause.
Along
with a FISA subpoena comes a gag order that bars recipients from
ever discussing it with anyone except their lawyer(s).
What's
wrong with the FISA Court?
There
is entirely too much secrecy. Meaningful information could be
shared without revealing vital secrets.
Secrecy
can be used to cover up malfeasance. Yet, because of the secrecy, it
might never be revealed.
FISA
Court members are appointed by one person – the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. The present Chief Justice could do this for a
total of 30-40 years, continually appointing people who share his
ideologies.
Ever
since FISA was implemented, all Chief Justices have been
Republicans, and 91% of the FISA Court members have been
Republicans. As a result, Republican Chief Justices have appointed
all of the members of both the FISA Court and the FISA Court of
Review – almost 50 appointments in total.
Democrats
tend to support civil liberties issues by almost a 2 to 1 margin
over Republicans. If Republicans on the FISA Court
follow suit, we cannot trust them to fully protect our civil
liberties.
The
FISA Court hears only one side of a case, so they are more likely to
rule in favor of that side. As of 2012, the FISA Court ruled in
favor of the government 33,938 times out of 33,949 cases.
Requests
for warrants or court orders are heard by only one of the seven
judges, who serve on a rotating basis. They meet as a group only
about six times a year.
What's wrong with the FISA Court of Review?
This
body consists of three members, and functions somewhat like an
appellate court. However, because 99.97% of the cases in the FISA
Court are decided in the favor of the government, there have been
very few cases for them to review.
At
least twice, this court has overstepped its authority in making
rulings on constitutionality, which are normally reserved for the
Supreme Court.
Conclusion.
Connecticut Senator, Richard Blumenthal, summed things up very
concisely:
“The
FISA court . . . in its current form — unaccountable, secretive,
one-sided — is broken. It not only lacks any genuine transparency
and accountability, but it also deprives the entire system of trust
and credibility in the eyes of the American people. The FISA
court is exactly the type of secret tribunal that fanned the flames
of revolution we celebrate each July 4. It’s time to change that.”
What Next? We will see ongoing debate on these issues to give the impression that Congress as a whole really cares about protecting the privacy of the American people. They don't want to risk their chances of getting re-elected by not showing proper concern. However, I have seen little movement toward anything but token legislative changes that will do very little to address these problems. I hope I am wrong.
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